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Abstract—Histograms and synthetic data are of key impor-
tance in data analysis. However, researchers have shown that
even aggregated data such as histograms, containing no obvious
sensitive attributes, can result in privacy leakage. To enable data
analysis, a strong notion of privacy is required to avoid risking
unintended privacy violations.
Such a strong notion of privacy is differential privacy, a statis-
tical notion of privacy that makes privacy leakage quantifiable.
The caveat regarding differential privacy is that while it has
strong guarantees for privacy, privacy comes at a cost of accuracy.
Despite this trade off being a central and important issue in the
adoption of differential privacy, there exists a gap in the literature
for understanding the trade off and addressing it appropriately.
Through a systematic literature review (SLR), we investigate
the state-of-the-art within accuracy improving differentially pri-
vate algorithms for histogram and synthetic data publishing. Our
contribution is two-fold: 1) we provide an understanding of the
problem by crystallizing the categories of accuracy improving
techniques, the core problems they solve, as well as to investigate
how composable the techniques are, and 2) we pave the way for
future work. In order to provide an understanding, we position
and visualize the ideas in relation to each other and external
work, and deconstruct each algorithm to examine the building
blocks separately with the aim of pinpointing which dimension
of noise reduction each technique is targeting. Hence, this
systematization of knowledge (SoK) provides an understanding
of in which dimensions and how accuracy improvement can be
pursued without sacrificing privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Being able to draw analytical insights from data sets about
individuals is a powerful tool, both in business, and in research.
However, to enable data collection, and consequently data
analysis, the individuals’ privacy must not be violated. Some
strategies [1]–[3] for privacy-preserving data analysis focus
on sanitizing data, but such approaches requires identifying
sensitive attributes and also does not consider auxiliary in-
formation. As pointed out by Narayanan and Shmatikov [4],
personally identifiable information has no technical meaning,
and thus cannot be removed from data sets in a safe way. Fur-
thermore, Dwork [5] proves that for essentially any non-trivial
algorithm, there exists auxiliary information that can enable
Both the authors contributed substantially, and share first authorship. The
names are ordered alphabetically.
a privacy breach that would not have been possible without
the knowledge learned from the data analysis. Consequently,
a strong notion of privacy is needed to avoid any potential
privacy violations, while still enabling data analysis.
Such a strong notion of privacy is differential privacy [6]
(Section II), which currently is the de-facto standard for private
data analysis [7], [8]. Differential privacy is a privacy model
that provide meaningful privacy guarantees to individuals in
the data sets. Essentially, differential privacy allows an analyst
to learn statistical correlations, without inferring information
about any one individual.
Differential privacy has spurred a flood of research in devis-
ing differentially private algorithms for various data analysis
tasks. In this work, we focus specifically on differentially
private algorithms for histogram, and synthetic data publica-
tion. Histograms and synthetic data are particularly interesting
because they provide approximation of the underlying data
distribution and synthesis of original data respectively.
There are many algorithms for histogram and synthetic data
publishing that achieves accuracy improvement for a fixed
privacy level, . Most often than not, accuracy improvement is
achieved through pre-processing the data set, post-processing
the query results, using query optimization techniques, or
algorithmic tricks that exploits the properties of the data, as
illustrated in Figure 1. There exists only a few works con-
cerning understanding the basic construct of privacy-accuracy
trade off in differentially private computations. This gap in
understanding the constructs of privacy-accuracy trade off
limits the space of differentially private accuracy improvement
techniques that tackle the core problems in acheiving accuracy.
Previous literature surveys [9]–[11] either focus only on
a single data analysis for example either histogram or syn-
thetic data, or focus on an arbitrarily selected set of papers.
Furthermore, previous work do not scrutinize and analyze
the components of each studied algorithms, but instead their
categorization of algorithms is based on each algorithm as
a whole. Consequently, to bridge the knowledge gap, we
conduct a systematic literature review (Section III) on accuracy
improvement techniques for differentially private histogram
and synthetic data publication.
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Figure 1: Places for accuracy improvement: A) Altering the
query, B) Post-processing, C) Change in the release mecha-
nism, D) Pre-processing
Thus our aim is: to summarize the state-of-the-art (Sec-
tion IV), identify trends in the literature, and to analyze
the constructs of differentially private accuracy improvement
strategies, in order to pave the way for future research.
Our contribution is a systematically structured, qualitative
analysis (Section V) of accuracy improving differentially
private histogram or synthetic data publishing algorithms.
More concretely, we provide: 1) A summary of the distinct
parameters of each algorithm (Section IV-A), 2) An overview
of how the different algorithms are related internally in our
survey, as well as to algorithms outside (Section V-A, V-B 3)
We pinpoint different dimensions of noise reduction strategies
to improve accuracy (Section V-C, and 4) An overview of
how the different techniques can be composed to build new
algorithms (Section V-D.
II. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
Differential privacy [6] is a statistical definition that enables
privacy loss to be quantified and bounded. In -differential
privacy, privacy loss is bounded by the parameter . The formal
definition of -differential privacy is given in Definition 1.
Definition 1 (-Differential Privacy [5]): A randomized
algorithm M gives -differential privacy if for all data sets
D1 and D2 differing on at most one element, and all S ⊆
Range(M), Pr[M(D1) ∈ S] ≤ e × Pr[M(D2) ∈ S]
A relaxed version of differential privacy is (, δ)-differential
privacy, Definition 2. (, δ)-differential privacy allows the
mechanism to sometimes, in extremely unlikely cases, release
an answer with much better or worse accuracy. In (, δ)-
differential privacy privacy loss is bounded by  with probabil-
ity at least 1-δ. That is, the probability of gaining significant
information about one individual, even when possessing all
other information in the data set, is at most δ. Note that
-differential privacy is a special case of (, δ)-differential
privacy with δ = 0.
Definition 2 ((, δ)-Differential Privacy [12]): A randomized
algorithm M is (, δ)-differentially private if for all data sets
D1 and D2 differing on at most one element, and all S ⊆
Range(M), Pr[M(D1) ∈ S] ≤ e × Pr[M(D2) ∈ S] + δ
When δ = 0, the algorithm is -differentially private.
The semantic interpretation of the privacy guarantee defined
in Definition 1, rests on the definition of what it means for a
pair of data sets to be differ by one element. In the literature,
the following two variations of neighbors are considered when
defining -differential privacy guarantee.
Definition 3 (Unbounded differential privacy): D1 and D2
are neighbors iff D1 can be attained by adding or removing a
single record in D2.
Definition 4 (Bounded differential privacy): D1 and D2 are
neighbors iff D1 can be attained by changing a single record
in D2.
Distinguishing between the definition of neighboring data
sets is important, because it affects the global sensitivity of a
function. The sizes of the neighboring data sets are fixed in
the bounded differential privacy definition whereas, there is no
size restriction in the unbounded case.
In the case of graph data sets, a pair of graphs differ by their
number of edges, or number of nodes. Therefore, there exists
two variant definitions in literature [13] that formalize what it
means for a pair of graphs to be neighbors. Nevetheless, these
graph neighborhood definitions are defined only in the context
of unbounded differential privacy.
Definition 5 (Node differential privacy [13]): Graphs G =
(V,E) and G
′
= (V
′
, E
′
) are node-neighbors if V
′
=
V − v and E′ = E − {(v1, v2) | v1 = v ∨ v2 = v} for
some v ∈ V .
Definition 6 (Edge differential privacy [13]): Graphs G =
(V,E) and G
′
= (V
′
, E
′
) are edge-neighbors if V =
V
′
and E
′
= E − {e} for some edge e ∈ E.
To statisfy differential privacy, a randomized algorithm
injects noise to the query answers to obfuscate the impact
caused by the presence or absence of an individual in the
data set. The difference between the answers to a query when
an inividual is in the data set or not in the data set, is the
difference the noise will need to obfuscate. This difference is
defined as L1 sensitivity of a function f or query on a data
set.
Definition 7 (L1 Sensitivity [6]): The L1 sensitivity of a
function f : Dn → Rd is the smallest number S(f) such
that for all x, x′ ∈ Dn which differ in a single entry,
‖f(x)− f(x′)‖1 ≤ S(f)
Since differential privacy is a property of the algorithm, as
opposed to data, there exists many implementations of differ-
entially private algorithms. Thus, we will not summarize all
algorithms, but instead introduce two early algorithms that are
common building blocks, namely: the Laplace mechanism [6]
and the Exponential mechanism [14].
Definition 8 (Laplace mechanism [15]): For a query f on
data set x, mechanismM responds with: f(x)+(Lap(∆f/))
Definition 9 (Exponential mechanism (EM) [14]): For any
function q : (Dn ×R)→ R, and base measure µ over R, we
define
εq(d) := Choose r with probability proportional to
e(q(d,r)) × µ(r)
To acheive trival accuracy improvement the parameter 
can be tweaked. However, tweaking  to achieve accuracy
increases the privacy loss. In certain settings,  grows too
fast to guarantee a meaningful privacy protection. To cater to
different applications, in particular for data streaming, different
privacy levels have been introduced. They are,
User level privacy All data connected to one individual
shares a joint privacy budget. Implicitly used in the original
definition of differential privacy.
Event level privacy [16] Every data point is considered in-
dependent and thus has its own budget
w -event level privacy [17] A set of w events are considered
dependent and share a joint privacy budget. If w = 1, w -event
level privacy and event level privacy are the same.
III. METHOD
Our systematic literature review (SLR) [18] consists of the
following stages shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: The SLR process, including the queries used in
Microsoft Academic, and the amount of hits each query
returned. Bold text represents entities recognized by Microsoft
Academic.
A. Query Construction
We used the semantic search engine Microsoft Aca-
demic [19], [20]. As opposed to a syntactic search engine,
Microsoft Academic connects papers to entities that represents
for example topics, authors and conferences. Consequently,
when using Microsoft Academic, there is no need to insert
synonyms to words because of the semantic search engine.
Thus, in our SLR we used two queries, one for each data
type.
B. Exclusion Criteria
The list of exclusion criteria (Table I), was manually
checked against the abstract of each paper. When a paper
matches any one of the criteria, it is excluded, otherwise the
paper is included.
Due to space limitations, the full list of excluded papers can
be found online1.
1https://github.com/jennshan/Sok Chasing Accuracy and Privacy
Exclude if the papers is...
1) not concerning histograms or synthetic data
2) not concerning pre-processing/post-processing/algorithmic tricks to solely
improve accuracy
3) a trivial improvement of accuracy through relaxations of differential privacy
or adversary model
4) concerning local sensitivity
5) outputting a machine learning model
6) pure theory, without empirical results
7) a patent
8) not releasing a histogram/synthetic data
9) a PhD thesis
10) not in English
Table I: Exclusion criteria
C. Qualitative Analysis and Categorization
The analysis was carried out by two people, each of which
deep-read a disjoint half of the papers to be the ’expert’
for. Then, all papers were tagged visually to be able to
make connections between papers. In parallel, each paper was
discussed and disseminated.
The method used for identifying different categories was
a hybrid combination of top-down and bottom-up. That is,
categories were designed both prior to the analysis (top-down)
as well as identified from reading the papers (bottom-up).
Then, the two views were merged to capture the different
flavor of topics.
IV. OVERVIEW OF PAPERS
All included papers and their corresponding algorithms are
listed in Table II. The techniques used by different algorithms
are then categorized in Table III.
Abbreviation Algorithm
NYHXZW19 [21] RCF
HRMS10 [22] Boost
BFCR17 [23] DPCocGen
XWG11 [24] Privelet, Privelet+, Privelet∗
DWHL11 [25] PMost, BMax
WGXLY17 [26] Tru, Min, Opt
XZXYYW13 [27] NF, SF
LXJL15 [28] DSAT, DSFT
ACC12 [29] EFPA, P-HP
LXJ14 [30] DPCopula
XXFGL14 [31] DPCube
XRZQR17 [32] DPPro
GM18 [33] GGA
LMG14 [34] CiTM
LCMM19 [35] IHP, mIHP
LWK15 [36] ADMM
PG14 [37] PeGS, PeGS.rs
DZBJ18 [38] Tλ
CSJ15 [39] RG
WHWDXY16 [40] BPM
ZCPSX14 [41] PrivBayes
ZXX16 [42] PrivTree
DLL16 [43] (θ,Ω)-Histogram, θ-CumHisto
HSLMZD16 [44] Outlier-HistoPub
GKR18 [45] PriSH
KMHM17 [46] Pythia, Delphi
DM17 [47] SORTaki
ZCXMX14 [48] AHP
Table II: Ledger for included papers
Category Technique Algorithm
Budget Utilization Check-then-release DSAT, DSFT, GGAWeighted BPM
Clustering Error Optimization AHP, CiTMV-optimal Histogram NF, SF, P-HP, AHP, DPCube, IHP, mIHP
Utility Function EFPA, Outlier-HistoPub
Constrained Inference
Dependencies PriSH
Least Square Minimization Boost, PMost, BMax, RCF
Linear Regression (θ,Ω)-Histogram, θ-CumHisto
Maximum Likelihood ADMM
Realizability CiTM
Sorting SORTaki
Hierarchical Decomposition
Bisection P-HP, Min, Opt IHP, mIHP
Kd-tree DPCube
Quadtree PrivTree
Neighbor Relationship Redefine CiTM
Passive Publishing Data Recycling RCFRetroactive Grouping RG
Projection
Edge Addition (θ,Ω)-Histogram, θ-CumHisto
Edge Deletion Tλ
Hashing PeGS
Random Projection DPPro
Sampling Bernoulli Sampling RG
Threshold
Adaptive DSAT, GGA
Fixed DSFT
Truncation Tru
Wavelet Thresholding Privelet+, Privelet∗
Transformation
Bayesian Network PrivBayes
Copula Functions DPCopula
Fourier Transform EFPA
Wavelet Transform Privelet
Table III: Categorization of techniques used by the different algorithms to achieve accuracy improvement
A. Categorization of approaches
Given that our two queries were designed to capture either
synthetic data or histogram papers, we examine how similar
the algorithms from the queries are, and manually represent
them as partly overlapping sets, as visualized in Figure 3. We
distinguish between the two data types by their different goals:
for histograms, the goal is to release one optimal histogram for
a given set of queries, whereas for synthetic data the goal is to
release a database that is optimized for a set of queries. Some
algorithms use similar approaches to the algorithms from the
other query; and therefore we put them in the intersection.
In Figure IV, we present objective details of the algorithms
in each paper, to show the different settings they operate in,
which allows for further understanding of which papers are
comparable.
V. ANALYSIS
We provide an analysis where we view the papers from
different perspectives: how they relate to each other (Sec-
tion V-A), how they relate to other work (Section V-B),
which dimension of accuracy improvement are covered by
different techniques (Section V-C), and the composability of
these techniques (Section V-D).
A. Internal positioning
To understand the relationships between the papers we have
analyzed, we provide a connection between them in Figure 4.
We show connections between papers that either build on
each other’s ideas, or when authors compare their algorithms
Figure 3: The two main categories visualized as a Venn
diagram, with each paper positioned in its corresponding
category. Notice that some papers use similar approaches and
therefore reside in the intersection.
through experiments. Then, we focus on analyzing the outliers;
namely the papers with many or no connections.
HRMS10 [22] provides post-processing through consistency
checks, which means it is not only comparable to other
algorithms, but also composable with many algorithms, thus
making it popular. LWK15 [36] is similar to HRMS10, but LWK15
Paper Privacy
Guaran-
tee
Privacy
Level
Neighbor Dimension Input Mechanism Metric Output
NYHXZW19 -DP Unknown Bounded 1D Static RR MSE Histogram
HRMS10 -DP Unknown Unbounded 1D Static Laplace MAE Histogram
BFCR17 -DP Unknown Unbounded Multi Static, Sparse Laplace Hellinger Partitioning
XWG11 -DP Unknown Bounded 1D,
Multi
Static Laplace MAE, MPE Range
count
queries
DWHL11 -DP Unknown Unbounded Multi Static, correlated Laplace MAE Cuboids
WGXLY17 -DP Unknown Unbounded 1D Static, correlated Laplace MSE Histogram
XZXYYW13 -DP Unknown Unbounded 1D Static Laplace, EM MAE, MSE Histogram
LXJL15 -DP User, w -
event
Unbounded 1D Dynamic, correlated Laplace MAE, MPE Histogram
ACC12 -DP Unknown Unbounded 1D Static, correlated Laplace, EM KL divergence, MSE Histogram
LXJ14 -DP Unknown Unbounded Multi,
sparse
Static Laplace MAE, MPE Synthetic
data
XXFGL14 -DP Unknown Unbounded Multi Static Laplace MAE Histogram
XRZQR17 (,
δ)-DP
Unknown Bounded Multi Static Gaussian, MM MSE, misclassification rate Matrix
GM18 -DP Unknown Unbounded 1D Dynamic Laplace MAE Histogram
LMG14 (,
δ)-DP
Entity Unbounded Multi Static, correlated MM, agnostic MPE Model
LCMM19 -DP Unknown Unbounded 1D,
Multi
Static, sparse Laplace, EM KL divergence, MSE Histogram
LWK15 -DP Unknown Unbounded Multi Static Laplace, MM MSE Contingency
table,
his-
togram
PG14 -DP Unknown Unbounded Multi Static Dirichlet prior Rank correlation Model
DZBJ18 -DP Unknown Node
privacy
Multi Static Laplace KS distance, L1 distance Histogram
CSJ15 -DP Event Unbounded 1D Dynamic, correlated Laplace MSE Histogram
WHWDXY16 -DP Unknown Bounded 1D Static RR NWSE Histogram
ZCPSX14 -DP Unknown Bounded Multi,
Sparse
Static Laplace, EM Misclassification rate, AVD Synthetic
data
ZXX16 -DP Unknown Unbounded Multi Static, correlated Laplace MPE Quadtree
DLL16 -DP Unknown Node
privacy
Multi Static EM L1 distance, KS distance Histogram
HSLMZD16 -DP Unknown Unbounded 1D Static Laplace, EM MSE Histogram
GKR18 -DP Unknown Unbounded Multi,
sparse
Static, correlated MWEM L1 distance, KL divergence Histogram
KMHM17 -DP Unknown Unbounded 1D,
multi
Static Laplace, agnostic L2 distance, regret N/A
DM17 -DP Unknown Unbounded 1D Static Laplace AVD Histogram
ZCXMX14 -DP Unknown Unbounded 1D Static Laplace MSE, KL divergence Histogram
Table IV: Mapping between papers and their corresponding parameters. Abbreviations: Average Variation Distance(AVD),
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS), Kullback-Leibler (KL), Matrix Mechanism (MM), Mean Absolute Error (MAE), Mean Percentage
Error (MPE), Mean Squared Error (MSE), Normalized Weighted Square Error (NWSE), Randomized Response (RR), Scaled
Average per Query (SAQ)
Figure 4: Relationships between the analyzed papers
formulate the problem as a maximum likelihood problem
instead of a linear program, or a least squares estimation like
HRMS10.
XZXYYW13 [27] introduce differentially private histogram
partitioning, using a two-phased approach combining the
Laplace mechanism and the exponential mechanism, which
is then continued by others. ACC12 [29] continues the the line
of research from XZXYYW13, but with an improved clustering
technique. ZCXMX14 [48] build upon both XZXYYW13 and
ACC12, but extend the idea by focusing on the improving the
trade off between the two phases. LCMM19 [35] also continue
the line of thought by XZXYYW13 and ACC12, but focus on
improving the accuracy for large, sparse data sets by devising
an algorithm whose sensitivity is independent of the data set
size.
DWHL11 [25] is quite different from the other papers as they
work with data cubes, and propose an approximate algorithm
for a NP-hard selection problem. XXFGL14 [31] also work
on data cubes, but their solution to the problem focuses on
partitioning with equi-width histograms or kd-trees, which is
completely different from DWHL11. Another data type that
stands out is the spatial data used by GKR18 [45], and as
there were no other papers focusing on such data, there are
no internal connections.
KMHM17 [46] is a bit of a special case, since Pythia essentially
chooses the best algorithm for a given data set, and does not
provide a new way of releasing data. Comparably, PG14 [37] is
alone in using dirichlet prior perturbation, and it also stands
out by compressing data using feature hashing. Two papers
use local differential privacy, but WHWDXY16 [40] design a
sophisticated way of weighting the privacy budget that is very
different from the techniques used by NYHXZW19 that also uses
local differential privacy.
Lastly, LMG14 [34] is mainly concerned with redefining
the neighboring relationship to enable relational databases
to be synthetically generated, which is not covered by any
other paper in the survey. However, this way of redefining
neighboring data sets reminiscent of the introduction of node
and edge privacy for graphs.
B. External positioning
In Figure 5 we visualize how the surveyed papers connect
to other papers. Here, we have the chance to include more
theoretical work, as those were purposely excluded in our
SLR.
The most frequent common denominator from outside work
is the matrix mechanism from LHRMM10 [81]. Several papers
in our survey use the matrix mechanism as part of their
own algorithm. Furthermore, the data-aware DAWA algorithm
from LHMW14 [82] is often used as a comparison during the
experiments. GS by KG13 [68] is also a popular algorithm to
use in comparisons, both for papers using event level privacy
and others. Papers dealing with dynamic data also compare to
BA by KPXP14 [17].
The idea of v-optimal histograms was introduced by
JKMPSS98 [58], and was first combined with differential privacy
by XZXYYW13 [27]. The papers that are connected to JKMPSS98
are due to their connection to XZXYYW13.
ACC12 [29] EFPA extends the SPA algorithm from RN10 [53].
The line of research considering Fourier transforms was orig-
inally introduced by BCDKMT07 [83] with the FPA algorithm.
PG14 [37] uses the idea of dirichlet prior, as introduced by
MKAGV08 [49]. Some papers also use, or compare to, MWEM
from HLM12 [60], which builds on HR10 [55].
The few papers that cover local differential privacy, WH-
WDXY16 and NYHXZW19, either compare to, or are inspired by
DJW13 [50], respectively.
C. Dimensions of Accuracy Improvement Techniques
Three different groups of optimization goals are observed
in the papers that we analyzed in this SLR. The goals are; i)
Figure 5: Positioning the papers to outside work [7], [17],
[49]–[81], external papers in the middle with size relative
to their popularity. Papers without external connections not
pictured.
to reduce the accumulated noise, ii) to reduce sensitivity and
iii) to reduce curse of high dimensionality. Figure V shows the
accuracy improving techniques grouped by their optimization
goals.
Accumulated noise reduction
As mentioned in Section II the Laplace mechanism, which
is a standard algorithm for releasing numerical values adds
noise of scale ∆f/ to a query answer.
In differentially private histogram publishing using the
Laplace mechanism, noise of scale 1/ is added to each bin
in the histogram. When the number of histogram bins is large
(finer grained bins), the noise error is large, especially when
the value of  is small. However, if the bin ranges are large
(coarse grained bins), but the bins are not uniformly populated,
the result will suffer from approximation error. Intuitively, the
accuracy is improved by finding a trade off between these two
errors.
Algorithms SF [27], P-HP [29], mIHP [35] and Outlier-
HistoPub [44] employs differentially private clustering to find
the sub-optimal histogram bin partitioning. In Outlier-HistoPub an
additional pre-processing step is used for smoothing the data
distribution before applying differentially private clustering.
In the differentially private clustering, exponential mecha-
nism is used to identify clusters. The quality of the clusters
depends on the proportion of privacy budget, , allotted to the
exponential mechanism. When a large number of clusters are
considered, which is the case in multidimensional data set,
the quality of clusters becomes imprecise because of small
privacy budget available for iterating the exponential mech-
anism. The clustering technique used in NF [27], AHP [48],
DPCube [31] and DPCocGen [23] instead operates on fine grained
noisy histograms to find good partitioning strategy. Once
the partitioning for the given data is obtained, a new noisy
optimal histogram is released using the Laplace mechanism.
Interestingly, Li et al. [35] considers another error component
besides the noise error and the approximation error. The third
error component captures the effect of exponential mechanism
during the partitioning step. Their algorithm mIHP [35] finds a
trade off between these three errors.
Instead of finding an optimal histogram for a given data set,
another opportunity to improve the accuracy of a histogram is
by adding varying amount of noise to different bins. Wang
et al. in their BPM algorithm split the histogram bins into
two disjoint sets; heavy hitters, and less interesting bins. The
privacy budget  is carefully split between these bins such that
the heavy hitters enjoys less noise. However, this optimization
is proposed for bitmap strings under local differential privacy.
Now, consider another case where the purpose of the
releasing a differentially private histogram is to answer a
random workload of allowable queries. When the workload
contains irregular and large ranges, and if the histogram is
optimized for the given data set as we saw above, the answer
to the workload involves counts of many small range bins.
Consequently, the noise error of the final answer is the sum
of noise of every unit-length counts (sequential composition of
differential privacy). Intuitively, if the answer to the workload
can be constructed by finding a linear combination of few
number of noisy counts, then accuracy of the final answer
will be significantly improved.
Algorithms Boost [22], DPCube [31], PrivTree [42] and Tru,
Opt [26] employ a strategy where the domain ranges are
hierarchically structured, typically in a tree structure. The
leaves are unit-length intervals, and the root amounts for the
entire domain range. Each internal node contains the sum of
the counts of its children. The intuition is, to find the fewest
amount of internal nodes such that the union of these ranges
equals the desired range in the workload. To further boost the
accuracy, in Boost the authors propose a strategy that imposes
constraints in the output space of possible answers, which
are used in the post-processing step to identify more accurate
answers in the output space. Following the result of Boost,
DPCube uses the post-processing step to improve accuracy. The
fanout of the tree is fixed in most of the above mentioned
algorithms, except in Opt, where the fanout of the tree is
adaptively adjusted.
In PrivTree, Zhang et al. demonstrates that fixed amount of
noise is sufficient to ensure differential privacy as opposed to
the noise calibrated to the height of the tree. This improves
the accuracy of the noisy counts.
Algorithm CiTM [34] uses the idea of hierarchical de-
composition (query tree) for relational databases with com-
plex schema. To account for elaborately correlated counting
queries, Lu et al. proposes a reverisble transformation called
denormalization on the relations. Furthermore, they extends
the differential privacy guarantee (Definition 1) to include
privacy protection for tuples that are correlated.
In Privelet [24], the domain values are transformed into
wavelet coefficients. Each wavelet coefficient is a linear com-
bination of ranges in the histogram. Answers to any range
query can thus be reconstructed by consulting a few wavelet
coefficients. A´cs et al. [29] uses discrete Fourier transforma-
tion to compress the domain space. Top k Fourier coefficients
are identified in order to reduce the noise error. Algorithm
EFPA [29], however is an extension of SPA [53] algorithm. In
EFPA, an improved version of exponential mechanism is used
to identify the value k.
The RCF algorithm proposed by Nie et al. [21] linearly
combines nosiy estimates to answer a given query under
local differential privacy. The linear combination strategy is,
however, used as a post-processing step in their application
settings.
When a dynamic data set is used to answer a workload,
the optimization techniques listed above are not directly ap-
plicable, since batch processing is not desirable for analysis of
dynamic data. Furthermore, knowledge about the target queries
cannot be predicted. To reduce the noise that accumulates
under sequential composition, we observed two approaches
in the literature that concerns dynamic data. One approach
is workload-aware optimization, and another approach is to
avoid releasing almost the same histogram multiple times.
To preserve the dependency constraint among the bins in the
histogram, PrivSH [45] uses the more informative query from
the workload to update the differentially private model that ap-
proximates the underlying data distribution. Upon completion
of the model, synthetic data is generated through sampling.
Algorithms RG [39], DSAT, DSFT [28] and GGA [33] on the other
hand, publish a new histogram only if there is a significant
change in the data set. These three algorithms use a threshold
value to measure the change, in DSAT however, the threshold
value is adaptively chosen under differential privacy.
Sensitivity Reduction
As mentioned in Section II, the choice of neighborhood
affects the global sensitivity of a function. For a function under
unbounded differential privacy, the L1 sensitivity of a function
considers all pairs of neighboring data sets of varying sizes.
In the graph domain, for most of the functions on a graph
data set, function sensitivity under node differential privacy
becomes unbounded. This is because, removal of a node and
its edges may, in worst case, results in removal of all the edges
in the input graph. Since the effect that adding/removing a
node has on the function’s output depends on the size n of
the graph, which is unbounded, the sensitivity is unbounded
as well.
Differential private algorithms in this group perform a pre-
processing step to bound the size of the graph, thus bounding
the function sensitivity, which in turn will results in reduction
of noise required to satisfy node differential privacy. (θ,Ω)-
Histogram [43] and Tλ [38] apply graph projection for bounding
the size of the graph. (θ,Ω)-Histogram and Tλ are optimized for
degree distribution and triangle count queries respectively.
Additionally, (θ,Ω)-Histogram includes differentially private
clustering and post-processing techniques to further boost the
accuracy of the degree distribution histogram. In the post-
processing step Day et al. uses either linear regression, or
power law distribution or uniform distribution in order to infer
and reallocate counts of degrees that were originally truncated
by the projection process.
Further, Ding et al. [38] and Day et al. [43] suggests
to release a cumulative histogram for specific degrees. The
sensitivity of the cumulative histogram is lesser than the
general histogram thus the resulting histogram is much more
accurate.
Curse of dimensionality reduction When the data set is
high-dimensional with large domain sizes, reducing the noise
by means of clustering the data set as histogram is not
computationally feasible, and it is also difficult to find an
optimal histogram. Because, as most of the counts will be
zero in a sparsely populated data set, even after clustering
the noise incurred by zero count, bins are ridiculously large,
which makes the answer utterly useless. The problem is further
aggravated when the goal is to release the private data to
answer a workload of any set of queries. Thus, to achieve
multiple private releases, yet preserving the usefulness of the
answers, the underlying distribution of the data set is released.
The release, optionally can be populated with synthetic values,
and the idea is that the release will answer any further
predicate queries. When the target queries or the underlying
data distribution is not known in advance, the techniques
listed in the above section does not improve the accuracy
of the estimated synthetic data. However, if the underlying
distribution is inferred from a set of low-dimensional marginal
distributions, then the impact of noise on the accuracy is
contained to a smaller set of attributes.
Accordingly, the techniques PrivBayes [41], DPcopula [30],
Pmost, Bmax [25], DPPro [32], and PeGS, PeGS.rs[37] in this group
decompose the high-dimensional domain space into a sub-
set of low-dimensional domain spaces. The low-dimensional
marginal distributions are then used to infer the joint distribu-
tion that approximates the underlying data distribution.
D. Composability of Approaches
From the dimensions identified in the previous section,
we take our analysis further by investigating how subset of
techniques may be composed. We also connect the papers with
the place 2 their algorithm operates on in Table VI.
Sensitivity reduction) As sensitivity is a property of the
query, there is a clear limit to how much sensitivity can be
reduced. In our SLR we identified, changes to sensitivity is
achieved by breaking down a query. Histogram query is broken
down into two separate queries: usually a Laplace counting
query and a clustering technique based on the exponential
mechanism, as in the case with [27] and consecutive work.
2Places refers to different points in the workflow of a typical differentially
private analysis, see Figure 1
Optimization Goal Addressed
Query Size
Algorithm
Category
Accumulated Noise
Single ClusteringTransformation
Workload
Hierarchical
Decomposition
Constrained In-
ference
Budget Utiliza-
tion
Transformation
Threshold
Passive
Publishing
Sensitivity Single
Clustering
Projection
Constrained In-
ference
Workload Threshold
Data dimensionality Workload
Transformation
Projection
Constrained In-
ference
Table V: Different dimensions of accuracy improvement tech-
niques, grouped by the different noise reduction goals
A B C D
NYHXZW19 [21] X X
HRMS10 [22] X
BFCR17 [23] X X
XWG11 [24] X
DWHL11 [25] X X
WGXLY17 [26] X
XZXYYW13 [27] X
LXJL15 [84] X
ACC12 [29] X X
LXJ14 [30] X
XXFGL14 [31] X
XRZQR17 [32] X
GM18 [33] X
LMG14 [34] X X
LCMM19 [35] X
LWK15 [36] X
PG14 [37] X X
DZBJ18 [38] X X
CSJ15 [39] X
ZCPSX14 [41] X
ZXX16 [42] X
DLL16 [43] X X X
HSLMZD16 [44] X X X
GKR18 [45] X X
KMHM17 [46] X X X
DM17 [47] X
ZCXMX14 [48] X
Table VI: Mapping the papers to each place where: A) Altering
the query, B) Post-processing, C) Change in mechanism, D)
Pre-processing
Another approach is through pre-processing the data set
by means of thresholding or projection in order to bound
the maximum difference between the neighboring data sets.
This pre-processing step is showed to compose with algo-
rithmic tricks and post-processing strategies. For example, in
PrivTree [42], (θ,Ω)-Histogram [43] and CiTM [34] thresholding is
combined with hierarchical decomposition/clustering and post-
processing.
Data dimensionality) Dimensionality can be reduced to such
a point that there still is sufficient important information to
carry out an analysis on. It still must be possible to extract
useful information from the data set after dimensionality
reduction. However, dimensionality reduction will be a source
of extra noise as well, provided it is not lossless, so it is not
a clear cut case when dimensionality reduction stops being a
beneficial method.
In the SLR, we identify different forms of projections
and transformations as effective dimensionality reduction ap-
proaches. Each paper only uses one dimensionality reduction
technique, and we have not yet seen composition of these
techniques. Dimensionality can be addressed in place C and
D, by using techniques in the algorithm or as part of the pre-
processing step.
Dimensionality reduction can also be achieved through a
divide-and-conquer approach. We see this in, for example, Li
et al. [30] considers composability in DPCopula, which is not
intended for small domains. They propose that it is possible
to pre-partition small domains using DPCube [31], EFPA [29],
PSD [59], and then compose the output with DPCopula on large
domains.
Accumulated noise) Accumulated noise can be tackled
through a diverse arsenal of techniques. In this dimension,
there is no clear limit to how many techniques can be com-
posed; but it rather seems to depend on the aspects of the data,
which ones can be successfully employed. Noise accumulation
is tackled in places B, C and D, post-processing, changes in
the mechanism and pre-processing respectively.
For example, the exponential mechanism relies on a utility
function that with high probability releases a value statistically
close to the real answer. Thus, the exponential mechanism
can be used in many settings, but the success is entirely
decided by which utility function is used. Consequently, the
exponential mechanism is highly dependent on the nature of
the data domain, as opposed to the real data, as this decides
the metric used in the utility function. Coming up with new
or adopting existing metrics can therefore be an interesting
research direction to reduce accumulated noise.
Another aspect of data that can be used to avoid accu-
mulated noise is to exploit consistency constraints. Patterns
in the data can be enhanced in the pre-processing step and
then validate the consistency constraints in the post-processing
step. One such example is SORTaki [47], where the bin counts
are ordered before the histogram is constructed, which then
enables consistency checks.
VI. DISCUSSION
One limitation of our method is that the SLR is limited to
papers with empirical results, since empirical measurement of
accuracy provide a better understanding of the error bounds.
However, in our analysis (Section V) of the papers, we
studied related theoretical aspects of accuracy improvements
and present the results in Figure 5.
A. Incomparable papers
A list of papers are excluded in the results presented in
the Section V. This is because, certain properties of their
algorithms make them incomparable with other algorithms.
In Table VII, we list the papers along with the reasons for not
including them in the results.
Yan et al. [85]: the DP-FC algorithm does not consider the structure of
the histogram a sensitive attribute, and thus achieves a trivial accuracy
improvement over other algorithms.
Liu and Li [86]: the APG algorithm does not perform differentially
private clustering, and therefore achieves better accuracy by relaxing
the privacy guarantees compared to AHP, IHP and GS.
Qian et al. [87]: SC algorithm uses the ordering of the bins in order
to calculate the cluster centers, but does not perturb the values before
doing so, and thus the order is not protected, making their guarantees
incomparable.
Li and Li [88]: the ASDP-HPA algorithm does not describe the details
of how their use of Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average Model
(ARIMA) is made private, and thus we cannot distinguish if the entire
algorithm is differentially private. Furthermore, the details of how
they pre-process their data set is not divulged, and it can thus not
be determined if the pre-processing violates differential privacy or
not.
Hadian et al. [89]: the algorithm is incomplete, since it only covers the
histogram partitioning, and does not involve the addition of noise to
bins. Furthermore, it is not clear whether they draw noise twice using
the same budget, or if they reuse the same noise for their thresholds.
As the privacy guarantee  cannot be unambiguously deduced, we do
not include their paper in our comparison.
Chen et al. [90]: GBLUE generates a k-range tree based on the private
data, where k is the fanout of the tree. Since private data is used to
decide on whether a node is further spilt or not, it does not provide
the same privacy guarantees as the other studied algorithms.
Li et al. [84]: In their algorithm, groups are formed on the condition
that the merged bins guarantee k-indistinguishability. Since this merge
condition is based on the property of the data it does not guarantee
differential privacy on the same level as the other papers, so we deem
it incomparable.
Table VII: Incomparable papers along with the reasons for
excluding them in the analysis
Further, in the analysis regarding dimensions of accuracy
improvement techniques presented in Section V, some al-
gorithms such as Boost [22], ADMM [36], SORTaki [47] and
Pythia [46] are excluded. The rationale behind the exclusion
is, these algorithms are not self contained, but nevertheless
improves accuracy of the differentially private answers when
combined with other analyzed algorithms.
Efforts such as Pythia [46] and DPBench [91] that provide
practitioners, a way to empirically assess the privacy-accuracy
trade off related to their data sets are commendable. However,
to effectively use the tool one needs to have some background
knowledge of the right combination of parameters to tune. In
our analysis of the algorithms, we mapped out the accuracy
improvement techniques grouped by optimization goals and
corresponding query size. This knowledge will allow practi-
tioners and researchers alike to think about other places to
explore for accuracy improvement, rather than finding the
algorithms that are based only on their data.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Motivated by scarcity of works that aims to structure knowl-
edge concerning accuracy improvement in differentially pri-
vate computations; we conducted a systematic literature review
(SLR) on accuracy improvement techniques for histogram and
synthetic data publication under differential privacy.
We present three results from our analysis that answers
our research objective: To synthesis the understanding of
the underlying foundations of the privacy-accuracy trade off
in differentially private computations. One, internal/external
positioning of the studied algorithms. Two, different dimen-
sions of accuracy improvement: accumulated noise reduction,
sensitivity reduction and data dimensionality reduction. Third,
we provide an overview of composable algorithms according
to their dimensions, sort-out by the places, in which they
operate. Our findings pave the way for future research by
allowing others to integrate new solutions according to the
noise reduction dimensions.
From our overview of composability, we see that most
efforts are focused on making changes in the mechanism,
and on post-processing. We believe from our comprehensible
categorization of the different approaches, that, it is possible
to take ideas from other disciplines and plug them in as new
techniques, which opens the door for many possible research
directions. We observe that, altering the query in one way or
another, is not popular, and we believe further investigation
is required to understand which techniques can be adopted in
this place.
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